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WOLSTON AND HUTCHINSON: CHANGING
CONTOURS OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
The classification of a plaintiff as a public or private figure is cru-
cial in a defamation action because each classification carries a signifi-
cantly different standard of proof. In order to receive damages in a
defamation suit, a public figure must prove "actual malice,"1 whereas a
private figure must show only the degree of fault required by state law.2
The two standards of proof have evolved out of the United States
Supreme Court's efforts to balance two mutually exclusive interests:
3
the individual's interest in his reputation and privacy4 and the first
amendment goal of ensuring unfettered debate on public issues.5 The
Court has pointed out that "'[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate.' "6
In order to accommodate these competing interests, the Court has
reasoned that constitutional protection is not appropriate for defama-
tory remarks about private persons because lack of protection does not
significantly affect debate on public issues and the states have an inter-
est in providing individuals redress from injurious attacks upon their
reputations.7 Recognizing that error occurs in any debate, however, the
Court has established a constitutional protection for defamatory re-
1. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
2. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (As long as states "do not
impose liability without fault, [they] may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual"). See Frakt, Defamation Since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Emerging Common
Law, 10 RtrT.-CAM. L.J. 519 (1979) for a discussion of the various states' different standards
[hereinafter cited as Emerging Common Law].
3. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,48 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(defamation law allows an individual to "preserve certain privacy around his personality");
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (law of defamation re-
flects the "basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being").
5. "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. For discussions of the scope of the speech and press clauses,
see Lange, The Speech andPress Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Introduc-
tion-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy. What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Repiy, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
120 (1975); Stewart, Or Of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
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marks about public officials and public figures, even though false, but
only if they are not published recklessly or knowingly.'
Despite the importance of the public/private figure distinction, the
Court has not yet offered a precise definition of public figure. Much of
the difficulty in defining the term stems from disagreement among the
Justices in two areas: first, the extent of constitutional protection neces-
sary to achieve the first amendment guarantee of free debate on public
issues and second, the question of when these considerations override
the states' traditional role in providing redress for defamatory remarks.
This disagreement has manifested itself in plurality opinions and in an
inconsistent application of a series of varying standards. 9
An examination of the Court's discussion of the public figure con-
cept reveals a conflict between the inquiry the Court has used in the
public figure analysis and the first amendment rationale for the pub-
lic/private figure distinction. Thus far in public figure analysis the
Court has considered whether a plaintiff had access to the media for
reply and whether the person voluntarily assumed the risk of defama-
tion through prior activities.1" If neither of these criteria is satisfied, the
Court has reasoned that the state has a legitimate interest in providing
a forum for redress.II By basing the extent of the constitutional protec-
tion on a person's need in a particular situation, the Court has not ade-
quately addressed the first amendment consideration of fostering free
and open debate on public issues. Because its primary focus is on pro-
tecting individual interests in reputation, the Court neither distin-
guishes the type of speech to be protected nor explains why protection
is required by the first amendment. 12
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See note 28 infra.
9. One indication of disagreement is the variety of views expressed by the Justices in
defamation cases. There was no clear majority in either Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), or Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Curtis, the
Justices wrote four separate opinions. In Rosenbloom, eight Justices wrote five opinions,
with three Justices joining the plurality, two concurring separately and three dissenting.
Gertz and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), were carried by a majority of five.
Four Justices dissented in Gertz and three dissented in Firestone.
For a discussion of some of the inconsistencies in defamation law, see Christie, Injury to
Reputation and the Constitution.- Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REv.
43 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Christie]; Eaton, American Law o/Defamation through Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond" An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1419 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Eaton]. In his dissent in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 484-93,
Justice Marshall discussed some of the inconsistencies he perceived in the majority opinion.
10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
11. Id at 343.
12. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 364 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971)) ("'the idea that
[Vol. 13
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This comment examines Wolston v. Reader's Digest 4ssociationI3
and Hutchinson v. Proxmire,4 two recent cases in which the Supreme
Court defined with more particularity the characteristics that distin-
guish private persons from public figures. These cases reveal that the
Court is continuing to narrow the concept of public figure so that it
now applies only to a very few. Considering the Court's implicit pref-
erence not to extend special privileges to the media, 5 a reversal of this
limitation is unlikely. The Court cannot continue to narrow the class of
public figures, however, without impinging upon the ability of the press
to perform its informing function. 6 In order to avoid the temptation to
certain "public" figures have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while
private individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal
fiction'"); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61
MINN. L. REv. 645, 661-65 (1977) ("Viewed in the light of first amendment values, this
distinction makes little sense.") [hereinafter cited as Ashdown]. But see Robertson, Defama-
tion andthe FirstAmendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 Tax. L. REV. 199
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
13. 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979). Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion.
14. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979). Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion. A major
issue in this case was whether a member of Congress is protected by the Speech and Debate
Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 6, when making allegedly defamatory
remarks in newsletters or press releases. This comment deals only with the Court's determi-
nation of whether Hutchinson was a public figure for the purposes of defamation law.
15. Narrowing the class of public figures and thereby reducing the number of cases to
which the actual malice standard applies is consistent with the Court's recent decisions not
to extend specific constitutional privileges to the media. See, e.g., Gannet Co. v. DePas-
quale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979) (reporter does not have right of access to pretrial procedures in
criminal case); Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979) (press receives no absolute privilege
for editorial processes); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (media has no special consti-
tutional right of access to county jails); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(search warrants permitted to inspect newsrooms); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)
(press not entitled to special access to information); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (reporter does not have the right to
conceal sources from a grand jury).
The Court however has provided protection for the press in limited areas. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979) (criminal statute prohibiting pub-
lishing a juvenile's name invalid as an imposition of "subsequent punishment"); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (Court did not enforce judicial gag order in report-
ing about criminal proceedings); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (striking down mandatory right to reply statute for political candidates). Professor
Ashdown distinguishes cases involving problems such as prior restraints because they in-
volve "material of imminent political impact." Ashdown, supra note 12, at 677, 689. He
perceives a subtle restriction of media protection to coverage of "matters of immediate polit-
ical relevance." Id at 646-47.
This does not indicate that the Court necessarily intends to limit the scope of first
amendment expression in all respects. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (extending constitutional protection to
commercial speech).
16. See Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of Press
Power, 54 TaX. L. REv. 271 (1976) [hereinafter cited as A Response]; Anderson, Libel and
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restrict further the public figure definition, 7 the Court must anchor it
to a first amendment rationale. In Wolston and Hutchinson the Court
has already subtly restructured the criteria it uses to determine public
figure status.1 8 These criteria suggest an appropriate rationale for the
public figure test as it is presently fashioned, making it more responsive
to first amendment considerations and less vulnerable to further limita-
tion.
II. ANTECEDENTS OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION
A. Public Officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' 9
Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court decision of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, defamation was not considered to be within the province of
speech or press protected by the first amendment.20 Before New York
Times, each state had complete autonomy in regulating defamation.
This regulation generally followed the common law tradition with de-
fendants held strictly liable for their defamatory publications.2 1 The
common law tradition recognized limited privileges for defendants, in-
cluding the privilege of "fair comment. 22 While this privilege ex-
tended to matters of public or general concern, it was generally limited
to opinions and did not extend to any false assertions of fact, unless
Press Se/-Censorshop, 53 TEx. L. Rav. 422 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Press Sepf-Censor-
ship]; Note, The EditorialFunction andthe Gertz Public Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723
(1978) [hereinafter cited as The Editorial Function].
17. See Christie, supra note 9, at 64. Professor Christie anticipates that eventually the
Court will adopt the Gertz requirement of fault for all types of defamation, regardless of
whether public officials or public figures are involved.
18. The emphasis in this comment is on the public figure concept, although the Court's
libel decisions encompass a variety of other issues. For a comprehensive history of defama-
tion law, see Eaton, supra note 9. See also Press Self-Censorship, supra note 16; A Response,
supra note 16; Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balanc-
ing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Brosnahan]; Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. andBeyond, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 471 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Evolving Law]; Robertson, supra note 12.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROS-
SER]. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957) (dictum); Beauhamais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libelous statements not a class of speech requiring consti-
tutional protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum).
The Court has not changed the idea that "there is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Rather, the Court has
determined that the press requires "breathing space" when reporting about activities of cer-
tain persons and therefore has created a constitutional privilege for those engaged in that
type of speech.
21. PROSSER §§ 111, 113, supra note 20, at 772-74.
22. Id § 115 at 792.
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made in good faith.23
The common law of defamation was radically altered in 1964
when the Supreme Court considered a defamation suit brought by the
police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, against the New York
Times. The defamatory statements appeared in a paid advertisement
that included accounts of police actions during civil rights demonstra-
tions in the South.24 The Court determined that libel could no longer
claim "talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the first amendment. '25 The Court
rejected truth as the only defense because of the potential for self-cen-
sorship by the press: "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need. .. to survive'. '26 Critics of govern-
ment might be stifled simply by the threat of having to prove the truth
of their statements in court, which necessarily "dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate." 27 Therefore, the Court held that
the first amendment limits a state's power to award damages to public
officials for defamatory statements relating to their duties, unless the
plaintiff proved that the statements had been made with "actual mal-
ice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.28
In its analysis, the Court found that state libel laws when applied
23. Id
24. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
25. Id at 269.
26. Id at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
27. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
28. Id at 279-80. Actual malice is a term of art describing the situation in which a
person publishes a defamatory falsehood "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id at 280. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74 (1964), the Court declared that a plaintiff must show that a false publication was made
with a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." The Court clarified this standard
in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); "reckless disregard" occurred when "the
publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false information" or when the
publisher "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id at 730-
31. Actual malice is distinguished from common law malice, which involves ill-will or evil
intent. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974); PROSSER §§ 113,
118, supra note 20.
The "actual malice" standard was conceived to be a strict standard designed to prevent
libel suits and thus remove the threat of self-censorship by the press. In fact, very few plain-
tiffs have been able to meet this standard. See Emerging Common Law, supra note 2, at 549-
50; Eaton, supra note 9, at 1375.
Justice Stewart, dissenting in Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1661 (1979), expressed
concern that the Court is gradually returning to the common law malice standard by al-
lowing inquiry into the editor's state of mind while writing an article.
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to public officials, were similar to the Sedition Act of 1798, which pro-
hibited criticism of the government. 29 The Court noted that the views
of critics of that Act "reflect[ed] a broad consensus that the Act, be-
cause of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and pub-
lic officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment."30 The
controversy about the Act provided an insight into the "central mean-
ing of the first amendment."'3' One commentator has described this
meaning as providing "a core of protection of speech without which a
democracy cannot function, without which in Madison's phrase, 'the
censorial power' would be in the Government over the people and not
'in the people over the government'. 32
The thrust of the Court's entire discussion was the importance of
free and open exchange of ideas in a self-governing society.33 The
Court noted a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate onpublic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
34
and acknowledged the long-settled "proposition that freedom of ex-
pression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment. 35
Applying the New York Times standard later that year, the Court rec-
ognized that "speech concerning public affairs is more then self-expres-
sion; it is the essence of self-government. ' 36 Although the holding of
New York Times only provided protection for defamatory statements
29. Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired in 1801).
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
31. Id at 273. See Kalven, The New York Times Case.- A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 204-10 [hereinafter cited as Central Mean-
ing], for a discussion on how the Court derived this meaning. The Court also relied on
earlier precedents, emphasizing the importance of free speech. See, e.g., Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (first amendment was designed to promote discussion to
bring about "political and social changes"); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931) (first amendment was designed to maintain "free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people").
32. Central Meaning, supra note 31, at 208.
33. The Court was heavily influenced by Professor Alexander Meiklejohn's theory that
the first amendment protects all speech of public concern. See Brennan, The Supreme Court
and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 14-15 (1965);
CentralMeaning, supra note 31, at 214-17. Professor Meiklejohn includes within the scope
of the first amendment "the freedom to vote" and "many forms of thought and expression
within the range of human communications from which the voter derives the knowledge,
intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment
which, so far as possible, a ballot should express." A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rv. 245, 255-57. This includes education, philosophy, sciences,
literature, the arts and public issues. If a subject had no "governing" or "social" importance,
it would not receive first amendment protection.
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
35. Id at 267.
36. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
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about public officials, the opinion was framed in broad first amend-
ment terms. The Court's language indicated that constitutional protec-
tion could not be limited to statements about public officials.37
B. Public Figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
38
In the consolidated cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and As-
soeiatedPress v. Walker,39 a divided Court extended the application of
the New York Times standard from government officials to public
figures.40 In the first case, Butts, the athletic director at the University
of Georgia, was accused by The Saturday Evening Post of trying to
"fix" a football game.4' The second plaintiff, Walker, a retired army
general was reported by the wire service to have led a march against
federal officers who were seeking to enforce a desegregation order.42
The Court made it clear that it did not consider the constitutional
protection to be limited to explicitly political criticism; it explained that
the purpose of a free press was to advance "'truth, science, morality,
and arts. . .' as well as responsible government."'43 Again emphasiz-
ing the need for open discussion on public issues, the Court noted that
"the public interest in the circulation of the[se] materials. . . is not less
than that involved in New York Times."
37. The public official classification was gradually expanded to include statements about
"anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office." Id at 77. It was further
expanded in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), to include the operator of a county-
owned ski resort. The Court stated that the public official category includes all persons in a
governmental position of such "apparent importance that the public has an independent
interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it." Id at 86. Profes-
sor Kalven anticipated the Court's direction: "the invitation to follow a dialectic progression
from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain,
like art, seems to me to be overwhelming." Central Meaning, supra note 31, at 221.
38. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
39. Id, reportedsub non Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.
40. Justice Harlan announced the opinion of the Court in which Justices Clark, Stewart,
and Fortas joined. Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result, but for different reasons.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented in part, espousing their view
that the Court should adopt a "rule to the effect that the First Amendment was intended to
leave the press free from the harrassment of libel judgments." Id at 172 (Black, J., concur-
ring). They had also advocated this view in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
293-97 (Black, J., concurring); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 90 (1966) (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). Justices
Brennan and White concurred in part and dissented in part.
41. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 136.
42. Id at 140.
43. Id at 147 (quoting I JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONG. 108).
44. Id at 154.
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The Court found both Butts and Walker to be public figures:
"Butts. . .by position alone and Walker by. . .[the] thrusting of his
personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy. '45 The
Justices, however, did not agree on a rationale for the extension of the
constitutional protection to defamatory remarks about public figures.
46
Justice Harlan, speaking for the plurality,47 characterized New York
Times as a case "close to seditious libel" and specifically rejected this
rationale as a basis for extending the actual malice standard to public
figures.48 Instead, he focused on the status of the plaintiff and the
states' interest in protecting individuals against attacks on their reputa-
tions. If a plaintiff deserved recovery, and the judgment did not com-
promise the "central meaning" of the first amendment, then Harlan
would have allowed the states greater latitude to redress injury, even
though debate might ultimately be affected in some way. In Curtis and
Walker, however, Harlan determined that the states' interests did not
outweigh first amendment considerations because both plaintiffs had
willingly become objects of public attention and had access to the me-
dia for reply.49
Although he concurred in the result of the decision, Chief Justice
Warren found no reason to distinguish between the treatment of public
officials and public figures "in law, logic, or First Amendment pol-
icy."5 He noted that the distinction between the public and private
sectors had become increasingly blurred so that many individuals not
in public office are "nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events
in areas of concern to society at large."'" They are, in effect, private
counterparts of the public official. The Chief Justice pointed out that
promoting discussion about public figures is particularly important be-
45. Id at 155.
46. The Justices also could not agree on an appropriate standard of proof in cases in-
volving public figures. The four members who joined Justice Harlan's opinion advocated a
standard based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."
Id at 155. This resembles a gross negligence standard. Chief Justice Warren agreed with
Harlan's result, but reasoned that the actual malice standard as defined in New York Times
was the appropriate standard for public figure cases. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Because Justices Brennan and White agreed with Warren, and Justices Black and Douglas
restated their absolutist position, the actual malice standard was ultimately adopted as the
standard of proof. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts
and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 275-78.
47. See note 40 supra.
48. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.
49. Id at 155.
50. Id at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
51. 1d at 164.
[Vol. 13
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cause public figures may exert as much influence as government offi-
cials even though their actions are not subject to the restraints of the
political process. Therefore, criticism of public figures provides a
means to influence their conduct and to counter their ideas. 2 For these
reasons, Warren believed the extension of the constitutional privilege
to defamatory remarks about public figures should logically follow
from the rationale in New York Times, which established protection on
the basis of the value of that speech in a free society. He would have
extended constitutional protection to reports about those who are in a
position to influence and to those who actually attempt to influence
public policy or social values. 3 Contrary to Harlan, Warren rejected
the balancing approach as an appropriate method to accommodate the
competing interests in defamation actions when people have assumed
roles analogous to public officials. Harlan, on the other hand, preferred
to balance the competing interests and extend protection only to re-
marks made about a plaintiff who, because of sufficient access to the
media or by virtue of having invited attention, did not deserve the
state's protection. This approach minimizes first amendment consider-
ations because it distinguishes between plaintiffs' attributes rather than
considering the value of the particular type of speech to a self-gov-
erning society.
C. Public Interest: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
54
The public figure concept was not clarified immediately because
the Court embraced an even broader application of the constitutional
protection in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. In this case, a radio sta-
tion had characterized a person who was ultimately acquitted of ob-
scenity charges as a "girlie-book peddler."" In a plurality opinion,56
the Court pursued the emphasis on free debate in New York Times and
Curtis by requiring constitutional protection for "all discussion and
52. Id at 163-64.
53. Id at 164.
54. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
55. Id at 34-36.
56. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Blackmun joined. They believed the New York Times rule should apply to a libel suit
brought by a private individual that involved an issue of public interest because the "pub-
lie's primary interest is in the event." Id at 43-44. Justice White agreed with the plurality's
reasoning but believed that its application should have been limited to the facts presented in
the case. Id at 62 (White, J., concurring). Justice Black advocated the position that all libel
actions against the press are unconstitutional. Id at 57 (Black, J., concurring). Justices
Harlan, Marshall and Stewart dissented. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
1979]
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communication involving matters of public or general concern," re-
gardless of the type of person involved.57 The Court emphasized that
the New York Times standard was designed to preserve the free and
open discussion required by the first amendment, not to preserve a
public official's interest in protecting his reputation. Therefore, the
Court rejected Harlan's rationale because "assuming the risk of defa-
mation by voluntarily thrusting [onelself into the public eye bears little
relationship. . . to the values protected by the First Amendment."
' ' 8
.Rosenbloom represents the culmination of the Court's expansive
interpretation of first amendment protection in defamation law. In
each case dealing with the problem, the Court emphasized the essential
importance of freedom of expression when compared with the interests
protected by defamation law. In Rosenbloom, however, the Court did
not distinguish the types of speech that must be protected to preserve
first amendment values. This distinction was implicit in Warren's ra-
tionale, because he would have extended the New York Times standard
by analogy to its seditious libel rationale. Under Warren's rationale,
public figures are defined by the amount of influence they intentionally
exert on issues that affect society. Under Rosenbloom, however, any
person involved even to a minor extent in a matter of general interest
loses the protection of state defamation law unless "actual malice" is
shown. The Court did not articulate a distinction between speech re-
quiring constitutional protection and that beyond its reach. This fail-
ure to discriminate and the ease with which lower courts found
plaintiffs to be involved in issues of public interest accounts for the
rejection of Rosenbloom three years later.59
III. PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION
A. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.60
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., an attorney sued the publishers of
57. Id at 43-44 (emphasis added).
58. Id at 47.
59. Very few courts had found defamatory material to be outside the sphere of public
interest. See Evolving Law, supra note 18, at 478-81 and cases cited therein.
60. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. Justice Blackmun concurred
separately, stating his preference for the rationale of the three-member plurality in
Rosenbloom. He said, "If my vote were not needed to create a majority, I would adhere to
my prior view." Id at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White disagreed with the majority's modification of the common law of defamation. Id at
354-55 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
reiterated the position he had taken in Rosenbloom. Id. at 361-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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an article in which he had been described as a communist and an archi-
tect of a plot to convict a policeman of murder. A prominent Chicago
attorney and author of several books, Gertz had represented the family
of the victim in a civil suit but had not been involved in the criminal
prosecution of the officer.61 Because the defamatory statements in
Gertz related to a national conspiracy to undermine the police, the fact
that the Court did not find Gertz to be a public figure indicates a depar-
ture from the Rosenbloom public interest approach.
The Court was dissatisfied with the public interest standard be-
cause it forced lower courts "to decide on an ad hoc basis which publi-
cations address issues of 'general or public interest'."62 In its place, the
Gertz Court adopted Harlan's balancing approach, which used varying
degrees of constitutional protection, the standard the Rosenbloom
Court had said lacked constitutional dimensions.63 Essentially, the
Court in Gertz characterized public figures as those who had access to
the media to "contradict the lie or correct the error"64 or those who had
invited attention and comment, thereby assuming the risk of defama-
tory remarks.65 Private figures, on the other hand, are "more vulnera-
ble to injury" and "more deserving of recovery."66
By using Harlan's rationale for the public figure determination,
the Court shifted its primary focus away from the first amendment con-
sideration of protecting free discussion on public issues toward a con-
sideration of the states' legitimate concern for protecting individuals'
interests in reputation and privacy. 67 The Court's suggestion that it is
helpful to consider "the nature and extent of an individual's participa-
tion in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation 68 adds
another dimension to Harlan's criteria. In Curtis, the Court had said
that Butts was a public figure because of his prominence as a university
athletic director.69 Although Gertz was a prominent attorney involved
Justice Douglas stated his familiar view that no libel law is constitutional. Id at 355-60
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 352.
62. Id at 346.
63. See text accompanying note 58 supra. "[Tihe Court's abandonment of 'public issues'
as a judicial criterion of the New York Times privilege may be construed as a repudiation of
the justification for First Amendment limitations on state libel laws articulated in New York
Times and its progeny." Brosnahan, supra note 18, at 791.
64. 418 U.S. at 344.
65. Id at 344-45.
66. Id at 345.
67. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
68. 418 U.S. at 352.
69. 388 U.S. at 154-55.
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in many civic affairs, the Court held that he was not a public figure
because the controversy involving the defamatory remark was not di-
rectly related to his notoriety.70 Although the Court stated that a con-
nection was necessary, the extent of the required connection was not
made clear. This additional criterion, however, indicates that the Court
intended to narrow the class of people to be considered public figures.
By substituting the word "controversy" for public interest, the Court
avoided the broad public interest determinations utilized in the Rosen-
bloom analysis.7"
The Court blended certain elements of Warren's distinction when
it recognized two ways in which one becomes a public figure for consti-
tutional purposes. Public figures are those who "have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society" or who "have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved."72 The Court did not
follow, however, the underlying basis for that distinction, which was
the analogy to public officials. The reason for granting protection when
reporting about public officials, as the Rosenbloom Court acknowl-
edged, was not that a particular plaintiff had compromised his interest
in his reputation, but rather because the first amendment requires pro-
tection of certain types of speech.
73
B. Time, Inc. v. Firestone74
Time Magazine erroneously reported that Mr. Firestone had been
granted a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. In a
libel suit, the Court found that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure
because she had not assumed a role of public prominence, even though
she was well-known in local society and subscribed to a press clipping
service.75 The Court also determined that she had not thrust herself to
the forefront of a controversy, although she'had called several press
conferences to defend her reputation after Time published the article.76
70. 418 U.S. at 352.
71. See text accompanying note 57 supra. "Controversy" refers to a matter involving
actual differences of opinion rather than simply a matter that arouses the interest of the
public. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 245 (1979) ("a discussion
marked especially by the expression of opposing views").
72. 418 U.S. at 345.
73. 403 U.S. at 47.
74. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. He was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Powell
filed a separate concurrence. Justices Marshall, White, and Brennan dissented.
75. Id at 453-55.
76. Id at 454-55 n.3.
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Implying that it had not entirely abandoned the Rosenbloom public in-
terest test, the Court stated that "[d]issolution of a marriage through
judicial proceedings is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in
Gertz."" Because of the emphasis on the type of controversy, the ap-
plication of the Gertz formula in Firestone was more confusing than
helpful in deciphering the Court's public/private figure distinction.78
Firestone revealed the inadequacy of the Harlan rationale adopted
in Gertz. If the Court had simply focused on whether Mrs. Firestone
had access to the media or had voluntarily sought public attention, it
would have found her to be a public figure. That the Court labeled her
a private figure shows a recognition of the need to consider the value of
a particular type of speech in society, a concern not specifically ad-
dressed in Gertz. Using the Warren rationale, Mrs. Firestone did not
attempt to influence, nor was she in a position to influence, governmen-
tal actions or public opinion, and therefore first amendment considera-
tions were not applicable.
IV. WOLSTON AND HUTCHINSON
In both Wolston and Hutchinson, the lower courts attributed pub-
lic figure status to both plaintiffs, largely because the respective contro-
versies were characterized as matters of public interest.79 These cases
provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the criteria
to be used for public figure determinations. 80
77. Id at 454. Justice Marshall noted this. Id at 487-88 (dissenting opinion).
78. See authorities cited in note 9 supra.
79. The language the courts used is reminiscent of the Rosenbloom public interest analy-
sis: the district court in Wolston determined that Wolston was a public figure because he
"became involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that invited atten-
tion and comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in knowing about his con-
nection with espionage." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 177 n.33
(D.D.C. 1977). The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that "by his voluntary action he
invited attention and comment in connection with the public questions involved in the in-
vestigation of espionage." 578 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Hutchinson, the district
court stated:
Given Dr. Hutchinson's long involvement with publicly-funded research, his active
solicitation of federal and state grants, the local press coverage of his research, and
the public interest in the expenditure of public funds on the precise activities in
which he voluntarily participated, the court concludes that he is a public figure for
the purposes of this suit.
431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
These cases deal only with "limited purpose public figures"; the Supreme Court did not
discuss the category of "all-purpose" public figures. Although the Court in Gertz had said
that there might be such a thing as an "involuntary public figure," the Court's narrowing of
the class of public figures in Woston and Hutchinson makes this even less likely.
80. Hutchinson and Woston are notable for the issues the Court did not address. For
example, the Court did not deal with the point raised by the concurring Justices in Woston
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A. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association"
Ilya Wolston, nephew of a convicted Soviet spy, was charged with
criminal contempt in 1958 for failing to appear at a grand jury hearing
on Soviet espionage. Although Wolston had cooperated in several in-
vestigations, he had missed one session because of poor health. Stories
about the investigations and his contempt citation appeared in New
York and Washington newspapers. In 1974, Reader's Digest published
a book that incorrectly listed Wolston as a convicted Soviet spy. In the
resulting libel suit, the district court determined that Wolston was a
public figure because he "became involved in a controversy of a
decidely public nature" and the court of appeals affirmed.
8 2
Reversing the decision in Wolston,83 the Supreme Court repeated
the Gertz rationale, that public figures are less vulnerable to injury be-
that lapse of time between the controversy generating the defamation and the publication of
the libelous statement might make a difference in a defamation suit. The lower courts had
rejected this argument and it was not brought up on appeal. 99 S. Ct. at 2707 n.7. Justice
Blackmun, however, stated that the "passage of time" was not foreclosed as a ratio
decidendi. Id at 2709 n.* (Blackmun, J., concurring). See Bamberger, Public Fipures and
the Law of Libel;A Concept in Search of a Defnition, 33 Bus. LAW. 709, 723 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Bamberger]. Another question implicit in Wolston, Hutchinson and Firestone
is whether the fact that the libelous publication reaches a substantially greater audience than
that in which plaintiff is well-known should have an impact on the defamation suit. See id
at 719. The Wolston Court also did not consider a distinction between so-called hot news
and works that require a great deal of time and research. Justice Blackmun suggested that
this distinction was significant. 99 S. Ct. at 2709-10 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Hutch-
inson Court did not consider whether the New York Times standard should apply to
nonmedia defendants. The finding that plaintiff was not a public figure made it unnecessary
to decide this question. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. at 2687 n.16. See generally, Ea-
ton, supra note 9, at 1403-08; Evolving Law, supra note 18, at 507-12. The Court specifically
declined to rule on the propriety of summary judgment in "actual malice" cases. Summary
judgment has been mentioned as a possible means to alleviate potential self-censorship by
the press. Press Sef- Censorship, supra note 16, at 454-58, 468-69. The trial court in Hutchin-
son had said that in determining "actual malice" summary judgment might be the rule
rather than the exception. 431 F. Supp. at 1330. Chief Justice Burger expressed "some
doubt about the so-called rule" because "[t]he proof of 'actual malice' calls a defendant's
state of mind into question. . . and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition."
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. at 2680 n.9 (citations omitted).
81. 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979).
82. 429 F. Supp. 167, 177 n.33 (D.D.C. 1977), af'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
83. 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979). In a striking departure from previous defamation decisions,
see note 9 supra, only one dissenting opinion was filed. Justice Brennan dissented, agreeing
with the court of appeals, which had stated: "'The issue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of
Wolston's involvement in that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of debate today
."' Id at 2710 (dissenting opinion) (quoting 578 F.2d at 431). Justices Blackmun and
Marshall concurred in the determination that Wolston was not a public figure. They be-
lieved the Court should have decided the issue on the basis of lapse of time; even if Wolston
had been a public figure in 1958, he had lost this status by 1974. Id at 2709-10 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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cause they have access to means of reply and, of more importance, are
less deserving of protection because of their voluntary exposure to the
risk of defamation. 4 Interestingly, the Court did not elaborate on the
application of either of these factors in Wolston. Instead, it restated the
two ways in which one becomes a public figure--either by possessing
persuasive power and influence or by thrusting oneself to the forefront
of a particular controversy in order to resolve the issues.8" The Court
denied that Wolston had become a public figure by receiving a con-
tempt citation. Even though Wolston could have expected public at-
tention by choosing not to appear at the hearing, he had not used the
contempt citation to take a stand on the propriety of the government's
investigations.8 6
B. Hutchinson v. Proxmire 7
Ronald Hutchinson filed a libel suit after federal agencies, which
had funded his behavorial research, received Senator Proxmire's
"Golden Fleece Award" for wasteful government spending. The dis-
trict court and court of appeals agreed that Hutchinson was a public
figure for the limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal
funds for research. 8 The lower courts based their determination on
Hutchinson's successful applications, local newspaper reports about the
grants, and the wire service report of his response to Proxmire's
award. 9
The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that Hutchinson only
became a public figure as a result of the publicity generated by the
award.90 His access to the media was stimulated by the award and was
not the "regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the
accoutrements of having become a public figure."91 The Court would
not allow Proxmire to create a defense by making Hutchinson the ob-
ject of public attention.92 The Court noted that Hutchinson's prior
publicity did not involve the public spending issue and that, through
his actions, he had not sought to influence policy or invite comment
84. Id. at 2706.
85. Id
86. Id at 2707.
87. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979). No dissenting opinions were filed with respect to the Court's
determination that Hutchinson was not a public figure.
88. 431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977), aftd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978).
89. 431 F. Supp. at 1327, 579 F.2d at 1035.
90. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
91. Id
92. Id
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about government spending.93
V. CONTOURS OF THE PRESENT PUBLIC FIGURE TEST
At first, it appears that the Court simply reaffirmed and applied
the Gertz formula in Wolston and Hutchinson, as though it hoped repe-
tition would adequately clarify the public figure standard. When com-
pared with previous cases, however, the focus of the Court's inquiry has
changed. The primary means emphasized in Wolston and Hutchinson
for determining public figure status is not to establish whether the
plaintiff had access to the media or voluntarily became the object of
public attention, but rather to determine whether the individual at-
tempted to use his position to influence public understanding or the
resolution of the issues involved in the controversy.
94
The test the Court has outlined for public figure determination
consists of essentially four parts. First, the Court examines the subject
matter of the defamation, implicitly deciding a threshold question of
whether it is of sufficient legitimate public interest.95 Second, the Court
determines whether it is indeed a controversy as distinguished from a
matter of general public concern.96 Third, the Court considers the
plaintiffs actions in relation to the identified controversy to determine
whether the plaintiff was involved in the controversy prior to the de-
fendant's defamatory remarks.97 Finally, the Court determines
whether the plaintiff actually took a stand in the controversy or merely
engaged in activities incidental to employment, legal process and so
forth.98 Although the Court previously stated that public figures are
those who thrust themselves to the forefront of public controversies to
influence the resolution of the issues involved, it provided few guide-
lines for measuring these criteria. The Court's recent decisions add
substance to the meanings of "controversy" and "thrusting oneself"
and show how these terms will be construed.
A. Controversy
In Firestone, the Court acknowledged that the type of controversy
was important without establishing specific guidelines for the courts,
although it implicitly recognized that certain areas of one's private life
93. Id
94. See text accompanying notes 122-127 infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 99 & 100 infra.
96. See text accompanying notes 101-110 infra.
97. See text accompanying notes 111-113 infra.
98. See text accompanying notes 114-121 infra.
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are not legitimate subjects of public concern.99 This indicates that the
subject matter of a defamatory remark must reach a certain level of
importance before the Court will consider it appropriate to apply the
stricter constitutional standard. In Wolston and Hutchinson, the Court
has provided few clues to answering this threshold question and per-
haps will continue this posture because of its fear that lower courts will
assume the task of determining "'what information is relevant to self-
government.' "oo
Even though the subject matters involved in Wolston and Hutchin-
son--Soviet espionage and government spending-were matters of le-
gitimate public concern, no matter how compelling the subject matter
of a particular controversy may seem, other factors must be satisfied
before a plaintiff will become a public figure merely by being associ-
ated with the controversy. First, the nature of the controversy must be
precisely defined. In Hutchinson, the Court pointed out that the de-
fendants had "not identified such a particular controversy; at most,
they point[ed] to concern about general public expenditures."' 0 1 The
Court noted that this was a concern shared by most people and, there-
fore, it did not qualify as a true "controversy."
In determining public controversy, the Court contemplates an is-
sue that sparks dialogue and compels people to take sides. This was
confirmed in Wolston. The Court indicated that it was "difficult to de-
termine with precision the 'public controversy' into which [Wolston al-
legedly]. . . thrust himself.' 0°2 The Court concluded, however, that it
could not have been Soviet espionage because, "[c]ertainly, there was
no public controversy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of per-
mitting Soviet espionage in the United States [because] all responsible
United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to it.'
0 3
The Court then accepted, arguendo, the categorization of the contro-
versy as the "propriety of the actions of law-enforcement officials in
investigating and prosecuting suspected Soviet agents."'" The Court
perceives a controversy as an issue that actually arouses debate and
99. "'Public controversy' is not the same as controversies of interest to the public." 424
U.S. at 454. Even in Rosenbloom, which extended the actual malice standard to encompass
any matter involving public interest, the Court still recognized that certain subject matter
should be excluded because of its relevance only to private aspects of a person's life. 403
U.S. at 48.
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
101. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
102. 99 S. Ct. at 2707 n.8.
103. Id
104. Id
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upon which people disagree and take sides." 5
By requiring that the controversy be adversarial in nature, the
Court has narrowed the class of potential public figures. It was aware
of this in Hutchinson when it pointed out that if it had accepted a gen-
eralized "concern about general public expenditures" as sufficient to
constitute a controversy, "everyone who received or benefited from the
myriad public grants for research could be classified as a public
figure."' 1 6 The Court labeled this a "subject matter classification,"'
10 7
which was rejected in every case since Gertz as being akin to the broad
public interest test of Rosenbloom.108 Similarly, the Court rejected the
contention in Wolston that "any person who engages in criminal con-
duct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on
a limited range of issues relating to his conviction,"' 1 9 because ac-
cepting this argument "would create an 'open season' for all who
sought to defame persons convicted of a crime.""'
B. Plaintifs Involvement in the Controversy
In Wolston and Hutchinson, the Court clarified the extent of the
required connection between the plaintiff and the controversy to which
it had alluded in Gertz.' Once an actual controversy exists, the Court
examines the plaintiff's actions in relation to it. The Court then seeks
to determine whether the plaintiff played a prominent role in that con-
troversyprior to the defamatory remarks. A person must have sought
public attention prior to the defendant's remarks, and these remarks, to
be protected, must be limited to the specific subject matter of plaintiff's
previously aired ideas or beliefs. Hutchinson defended his receipt of
105. Contrast this with the statement by Justice Brennan that he agreed with the court of
appeals when it said: "'The issue of Soviet espionage in 1958 and of Wolston's involvement
in that operation continues to be a legitimate topic of debate today, for that matter concerns
the security of the United States."' 99 S. Ct. at 2710 (dissenting opinion) (quoting 578 F.2d
427, 431).
106. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
107. Id
108. Id. See also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. at 2708 (discussing repudia-
tion of the Rosenbloom test).
109. 99 S. Ct. at 2708.
110. Id at 2708-09. The Court stated that "[t]he public interest in accurate reports of
judicial proceedings is substantially protected by Cox Broadcasting Co." Id at 2708 (citing
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976)). The Court's determination in Wolston is
difficult to rationalize with the language of Cox. In Cox, the Court emphasized its belief
that broad press coverage of governmentfunctions, particularlyjudicialfunctions, is necessary
to vote intelligently and to convey opinions on the administration of government in general.
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1974).
111. See 418 U.S. at 345.
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government funds after Proxmire's remarks. Therefore, the Court
found that he had not been involved in a controversy about public
spending prior to Proxmire's defamatory remarks. 1 2 If Hutchinson
had made similar statements prior to Proxmire's award, he would prob-
ably have been classified as a public figure for purposes of response.
The result would have been similar in Firestone had Mrs. Firestone
publicized the details of her marital problems prior to the divorce pro-
ceedings. In Hutchinson, the Court adamantly rejected the idea that
one charged with defamation could cause a person to become a public
figure by focusing public attention on him.'
13
Once the Court has determined that the plaintiff was involved in
the controversy prior to the defamatory remarks, it examines the plain-
tiff's actions to see whether they were designed to influence others to
accept a particular idea or position. This appears to be the essence of
the "thrusting oneself' requirement. 1 4 The requisite involvement in
the controversy may not be present if the plaintiffs actions occurred in
the normal course of employment or other activity.
Even though Gertz was a well-known attorney involved in a high-
ly publicized trial, the Court was influenced by the fact that he had
limited his activities to actions necessary to represent his client. Simi-
larly, in Wolston, the Court said the plaintiff had "limited his involve-
112. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
113. Id
114. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345. Recently a California Court of
Appeal applied the test as formulated in Woston and Hutchinson in a libel action by a high
school teacher against a fraternal organization.
We conclude, in light of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
that appellant was not a public figure. In the course of her teaching duties she
simply made a selection of teaching materials which, for all that appears, was in
good faith and for the purpose of discharging her teaching duties. There is no
showing that appellant ordered the book for the purpose of inciting controversy.
She declares without contradiction that she did not anticipate controversy. It is not
clear that, but for the vigorous reaction of Lodge 1108, there would ever have been
a controversy. At the public meeting at which the Elks' complaint was first dis-
cussed appellant offered to withdraw the book and to use, instead, copied excerpts
of the type she had used during the preceding school term without complaint or
controversy. The record contains no indication that any of appellant's subsequent
activities in connection with the controversy extended beyond what was required
of her by school district regulations or to respond to inquiries initiated by the me-
dia. Appellant did not call press conferences, take her case to the public in an
attempt to influence resolution of the issues, or in any other sense assume "special
prominence" beyond that which Lodge 1108 thrust upon her. For all that appears
of record appellant simply maintained her aplomb and waited for the issue raised
by Lodge 1108 to be resolved. The evolution of the "public figure" rules from
Butts through Wolston makes clear that appellant did not relinquish her interest in
the protection of her own name.
Franklin v. Benevolent Order of Elks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 915, 930-31, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 140-
41 (1979).
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ment to that necessary to defend himself of the contempt charge."'' 15
He did not attempt to influence the government's actions or public
opinion. Although the lower courts found Wolston's actions in receiv-
ing the contempt citation to be voluntary, the Supreme Court described
him as having been "dragged unwillingly" into the controversy, be-
cause the government had pursued him in its investigation.' 1 6 This re-
sembles Mrs. Firestone's predicament. The Court found her actions to
be involuntary because she was required to initiate judicial proceedings
in order to obtain support payments. 1 7 She had not attempted to use
the media to publicize her case or to sway sympathy in her favor but
rather sought attention only to respond to specific allegations. Hutch-
inson also resorted to the media only to respond to specific allegations.
There was no evidence that he had ever used the media to gain special
consideration in receiving grants or to generate public support for his
work. The lower courts based their finding that Hutchinson was a pub-
lic figure partially on his successful grant applications and publica-
tions. I 8 As in Gertz, however, these were merely activities incident to
his career. The Court determined he had not invited the degree of pub-
lic attention and comment necessary to make him a public figure
through these activities. Instead, his "activities and public profile are
much like those of countless members of his profession. His published
writings reach a relatively small category of professionals . ... 'I
The Court's discussion of the facts in Wolston and Hutchinson
makes it clear that a plaintiff can be associated with a matter of public
interest and not be a public figure for purposes of defamation law. In
order to become a public figure, one's actions must be outside the nor-
mal response to everyday situations or activities in which one engages.
A person must be intentionally involved in the controversy specifically
for the purpose of influencing the issues. The person's actions must be
calculated to draw attention to particular ideas, values or beliefs. Ac-
cording to the concurring Justices's interpretation of the majority opin-
ion in Wolston, the Court requires that a person "mount a rostrum to
advocate a particular view" 2' in order to become a public figure for
discussion of a particular issue. This is a more stringent formulation of
the requirement that public figures are those who have "thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to in-
115. 99 S. Ct. at 2707.
116. Id
117. 424 U.S. at 454.
i18. 431 F. Supp. at 1327.
119. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
120. 99 S. Ct. at 2709 (Blackmun & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
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fluence the resolution of the issues involved."' 121
VI. UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The criteria the Court used in Wolston and Hutchinson to deter-
mine public figure status-defining the controversy and then consider-
ing the plaintiff's involvement in it-are not consistent with the
rationale for adopting the public/private figure distinction advanced by
the Court in Gertz. According to that rationale, those who had access
to the media for rebuttal and those who had voluntarily sought public
attention were to be given less protection, because the state's interest in
providing a forum for redress was correspondingly reduced. In the re-
cent cases, in which the Court has not found a plaintiff to be a public
figure, the Court has repeatedly explained away factors that would re-
sult in a public figure determination under the Gertz rationale.
A. Media Access
Mrs. Firestone and Mr. Hutchinson both had access to the media
for countering public criticism, but in each case, the Court discounted
this in determining they were private figures. The Court implied that
media access is more than a means of self-help to restore one's good
name as it was described in Gertz. 2 ' It is, rather, an indicator of a
person's notoriety. When the Court considers a person's access to the
media it uses it to gauge the degree of influence that the person could
exert on society. This is apparent in Hutchinson; the Court described
media access as one of the "accoutrements of having become a public
figure."
123
B. Assuming the Risk of Defamation
The Firestone and Hutchinson cases demonstrate that one can re-
ceive public attention for achievements or status and not be classed as a
public figure. The Court's requirement that a person receive public at-
tention in the course of advocating a particular view in an identified
controversy limits privileged criticism to a very narrow area: that in
121. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 345.
122. Id at 344. This aspect of the Harlan rationale seems incongruent when juxtaposed
with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), decided the same day as
Gertz. The Court held that Florida's "right to reply" statute was unconstitutional because it
violated the first amendment. Id at 258. In Gertz, the Court recognized that "[a]n opportu-
nity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of
defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie." 418 U.S.
at 344 n.9.
123. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
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which a person attempts to influence or actually does influence public
opinion.
In Hutchinson, the Court emphasized that the plaintiff had "not
thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence
others."'124 Similarly, in Wolston, the Court used language indicating
that its primary consideration is not that a person voluntarily assumed
the risk of defamation but rather that a person is likely to exert a level
of influence on society. It spoke of engaging the "attention of the pub-
lic in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved."'
' 25
The Court noted that Wolston did not "seek to arouse public sentiment
in his favor and against the investigation."' 26 And, most importantly,
there was no evidence that his failure to appear at the grand jury hear-
ing "was intended to have, or did infact have, any effect on any issue of
public concern."'
127
This inquiry does not respond to the notion advanced in Gertz that
by voluntarily seeking public attention a person diminishes the state's
interest in protecting him. One can attract public attention but, if that
attention is not the consequence of advocating a particular position in a
controversy, one does not become a public figure. As with access to the
media, the Court seems to use this inquiry not to determine whether a
plaintiff deserves the protection of the state but rather to estimate that
person's level of influence in the resolution of public issues.
C Proposal
One senses an inconsistency when comparing the criteria the
Court used to determine public figure status in Hutchinson and Wol-
ston with the rationale for the public/private figure distinction. The
factors prominent in the factual analysis of these cases indicate that the
Court's emphasis is shifting away from Harlan's rationale and the in-
quiry into whether the plaintiff had media access or had voluntarily
assumed the risk of defamation. This inquiry does not adequately ad-
dress the first amendment consideration of providing constitutional
protection for speech that is important in the discussion of public is-
sues.'28 The criteria the Court examines in the public figure analysis in
Wolston and Hutchinson, the nature of the controversy and the plain-
124. Id (emphasis added).
125. 99 S. Ct. at 2708 (emphasis added).
126. Id
127. Id (emphasis added). This would involve a situation in which a person invites a
contempt citation to use it as a "fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being
used in connection with an investigation or prosecution." Id
128. See notes 58 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
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tiffs involvement in it, are designed to protect the media when report-
ing about those who attempt to shape public opinion or policy on issues
that may affect the entire population.
These criteria embody Chief Justice Warren's extension of the se-
ditious libel rationale into the private sphere. They reflect his concern
that the media should have constitutional protection when discussing
persons who assume positions of influence or power analogous to pub-
lic officials.' 29 Speech about these people is particularly valuable be-
-cause of their potential impact on political life in general. First
amendment protection is necessary to protect reports about those who
have prominently espoused their views because these views are often
directed toward utilizing the political processes. This type of speech is
important to an informed electorate because it may ultimately influ-
ence societal values and public policy. For these reasons, and not be-
cause of the speaker's access to the media or prior activities, the press
should receive protection when reporting about those who publicly ex-
press their views.
The rationale for the public figure distinction must reflect the par-
ticular value of the speech it protects. Because the criteria the Court
uses are designed to identify those persons who are in a position to
influence public policy, an appropriate rationale is one that protects the
media when reporting about these influential persons within a broadly
defined range of activities. 3' Although this is largely a semantic differ-
ence and produces no change in the results of previous cases, it pro-
vides a rationale responsive to the first amendment. The Court could
acknowledge that, instead of determining the level of protection a per-
son deserves in a particular situation, the focus of inquiry should be the
influence that person exerts on societal affairs. Speech about such per-
sons is relevant to self-government and therefore deserves first amend-
ment protection because these people "play an influential role in
ordering society."'
' 31
This rationale does not require the Court to state explicitly which
129. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
130. "A theory conceiving first amendment freedoms as assuring a flow of information
essential to self-government may be called a public speech theory." D. Meiklejohn, Public
Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 819,
819 (1975). The definition of what is "public" "requires distinguishing between events the
knowledge of which contribute to the formation of public opinion necessary to effective self-
government" and those which are unrelated to this end. Id at 827. The rationale for pro-
tecting public speech is that "American government is directed by American public opinion,
[for] the freedoms worth affirming are those essential to the formation of that opinion." Id
at 820.
131. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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subject matters will be protected; it avoids forcing lower courts to make
adhoc determinations of what constitutes "general interest" and leaves
those who choose to "take sides" on issues to determine the subjects
receiving constitutional protection. The issues on which people are
likely to take a public stand will generally coincide with those neces-
sary to maintain an informed electorate. The requirement that a public
figure speak out on an issue first ensures that privileged remarks will be
limited to the scope of the person's involvement in the controversy. In-
terests in privacy and reputation would be protected because it is un-
likely that a person will initiate a public debate on a purely private
matter.
This rationale is consistent with the New York Times standard be-
cause it extends protection to comments about private persons who
have assumed a role in determining the course of public affairs. Two
other standards that have been proposed-prior media coverage and
access to the media for rebuttal- 132are less predictable and, in some
situations, allow the media to create its own public figures. In addition,
they do not place adequate emphasis on first amendment considera-
tions. Extending the protection only to purely political speech excludes
a great deal of speech necessary to develop an informed electorate
133
and creates the problem of separating explicitly political speech from
speech concerning other issues about which the public must make deci-
sions. Retaining only the public official category, as Warren pointed
out, inhibits press coverage of many who exert equal influence on pub-
lic affairs.
134
VII. CONCLUSION
The continued vitality of the public figure concept requires that
the Court's rationale for the public/private figure distinction be consis-
tent with the criteria used to make that determination and the first
amendment. The criteria and rationale that emerge from Wolston and
Hutchinson represent a compromise between the repudiated Rosen-
bloom public interest standard, which ignored interests in privacy and
reputation, and the Gertz formula, which subordinated first amend-
ment considerations to interests in privacy and reputation.
If the Court were to recognize the first amendment rationale im-
plicit in the criteria it uses to make the public figure determination, the
132. See The Editorial Function, su'pra note 16, at 1745-50.
133. See Bork, Neutral Princoles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25-
27 (1971).
134. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 13
CHANGING CONTOURS
concept would be less vulnerable to further narrowing by the Court.
Presumably, the first amendment value in speech about those who seek
to use their influence to affect public policy would outweigh interests in
reputation. By clearly enunciating a rationale consistent with the crite-
ria used in the public figure analysis in these cases, the Court could
clarify the scope of the intended protection and assist lower courts and
the press in classifying a particular person as a public or private figure.
This is particularly important, because confusion about the standard
encourages litigation'35 leading to the self-censorship that the actual
malice standard was originally adopted to prevent.' 36
Jean Arnwine
135. Press Self-Censorshp, supra note 16, at 430-34.
136. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
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